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Abstract 
In this paper, we derive the improvement in benefit by using real time 
information on traffic conditions on each road. By using real time infor- 
mation, an individual can choose the less congested path and thus get to the 
destination faster than otherwise. When we have real time information, a 
route which takes more time on the average can sometimes be used for an 
individual's benefit to reduce the congestion cost In addition to an individ- 
ual's benefit improvement, real time information improves the utilization of 
each road in a traffic system. By inducing more balanced trac flow on each 
road, we can reduce the whole society's congestion cost. Although this paper 
analyzes traffic systems which have multiple routes to the destination, the 
methodology can be corresponded to a dynamic routing problem in a 
queueing system with multiple queues and servers. 
1. Introduction 
When a person drives a car from a starting point to a destination, he may 
choose one of many routes to the destination. If he happens to be caught in 
a traffic jam in the path he chose, he wishes to have chosen another path 
which is less congested. If he had chosen the less congested path 
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from the beginning, he might have saved lots of time and cost. This is poss- 
ible if he can get the real-time information on the traffic conditions of many 
possible routes to the destination. This kind of situation can occur to a truck 
company which transports several products to many customers. When JIT 
delivery is required, choosing a right path will save lots of cost. We first con- 
sider the case where the departure time is given and a customer tries to 
analyze the benefit of real-time information in minimizing the transportation 
cost(section 2). And then we deal with the case where the departure time is 
also a decision variable in minimizing total transpotation cost(section 3). 
In this paper we study the value of real-time information on traffic 
conditions. If we get the real-time information on the traffic congestion of 
many roads, we may choose the least congested path and thus can arrive at 
the destination faster and in a less costly way. We consider the value of in- 
formation in terms of saving the mean(first moment) time used to arrive at 
the destination. We discuss the implications of this paper for both policy 
makers and individual customers. The other areas to which our analysis can 
be applied will also be discussed in the concluding remarks. 
The incompatibility between individual optimization and social opt- 
imization in a queueing system was studies in Naor[1969]. He showed that 
without any extra cost more individuals would enter the queueing system for 
service than socially optimal level. This is beacuse by entering the queueing 
system an individual incurs externality cost to all the other users of the 
queueing system but he takes into account only the cost imposed on himself, 
which is merely a fraction of the total externality cost. In order to achieve 
the socially optimal arrival rate of customers, Naor suggested levying tolls 
whose value plus the individual cost(the effective cost) woluld induce the 
socially optimal level. Another way to reduce the discrepancy between the 
individual optimization and the social optimization was suggested in Nam 
[1995]. He suggested that giving imperfect information on the queue states 
would induce fewer entrance to the queueing system and thus alleviate the 
discrepancy. Mendelson[1985] studied pricing mechanisms for another 
queueing system which offers computer service. Incorporating queueing ef- 
fects to the microeconomics of computing center management, he dealt with 
pricing schemes under various settings. In terms of the subject covered, 
Yoshino et al.[1995] is closely related to our model. They gave a real 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 125 
case showing benefit improvement by using real time information on the 
trafflc conditions of a highway. 
In our paper, we consider a queueing system(specifically a traffic system, 
for example) where there are more than one servers. Each server can be 
corresponded to traffic route to a destination. Previous researches focused 
on attaining socially optimal level of congestion by using pricing mechanism 
(Naor[1969], Mendelson[1985]) or by giving more vague information on 
queue states(Nam[l995]). In the current paper, we specifically deal with a 
traffic system and derive the benefit improvement of an individual when 
she /he  gets the real-time information on traffTc conditions and thus chooses 
the less congested path. Our model newly considers a queueing system 
(specifically traffic system) with multiple servers(paths). In the previous 
researches, they were concerned whether a customer enters the service sys- 
tem or not. In our model, we assert when we get the real time information 
on the queue states(number of cars in each path), we would be better off by 
avoiding more congested path and arriving at the destination faster than 
otherwise. In addition to this individual benefit improvement, the real time 
information on traffic conditions would induce more effective use of traffic 
routes by balancing usage across several paths. This will be called social 
benefit improvement. Although we specifically deal with a traffic system, we 
can extend the idea to the scheduling problem for multi-machine job shop. 
2. Case Where Departure Time Is Fixed 
2.1 Individual Benefit Improvement 
We use the mean time spent for arriving at the destination as the criterion 
for judging which path is better. Obviously we also can interpret the mean 
time as mean cost for arriving at the destination. Let us assume that there 
are two routes to a destination for simplicity. And the time it takes to get to 
destination through the first path is denoted as a random variable X, and 
the time through the other path as Y. We can generalize this interpretation 
such that X denotes the cost felt by a customer due to congestion. Readers 
should note that time in this paper can also mean congestion cost. It is also 
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assumed that X and Y are independent. The number of paths(current1y 
two) can be enlarged without any difficulty. The notation A menas taking 
the minimum between the two (i. e., x Ay = min{x, y)). 
Lemma 1 
E ( X  A Y ) ~  E(X) AE(Y). 
Root Since XAYa'"'9X and XAYa.'.<Y(a.s. means almost surely or with 
probability I) ,  the result follows. 
More generally, since X AYa'" < X implies that P(XAY < a) r P(X< a) for 
all a, we know X first-order stochastically dominates XAY. When a person 
does not have any information on the traffic conditions of paths 1 and 2, he 
will choose either of them randomly or one which is faster in the mean. But 
if he is informed on the current traffic conditions on both of the roads, he 
will choose the path which is less congested and thus can arrive at the desti- 
nation faster. In this case the time required to arrive at the destination will 
be XAY. We can define the value of real-time information on the traffic 
conditions in this case as V2 = aE(X)+ (1 - a)E(Y) - E(XAY), where a is the 
chance of customer's using path 1. When we have several(say n)  paths which 
lead to the destination, the value of information becomes even larger: 
n 
Vn = aiE(Xi)- E(XlAX2... AX,), where ai is the chance of customer's 
i=  1 
using path i. By Lemma 1, we know Vn>O. 
Example 1: Let Xi denote the time or cost for using path i from the 
starting point to the destination(i=l, 2, ... , n). All the times required 
are assumed to follow the same exponential distribution. That is, Xi- 
Exp(A). Without any information on the traffic states of n routes the 
expected time for travel is 1 / A .  When we get the real-time information 
on the traffic states of each road, we can choose the one with least con- 
gestion and thus the time it takes is 
min {Xi) 
i= 1.2. ..., n 
We know that 
min {Xi>- Exp(nA). 
i=1,2, ..., n 
In this case the mean traveling time is 1 / (nl) and thus reduced by n times. 
The value of real-time information becomes A ( 1 -  1 / n )  >O. 
We have seen that we can in this case improve the mean time spent for ar-  
riving at the destination by %(the number of possible routes) times. Thus if 
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we can use the real-time information on the trac conditions, we can cover 
n times more customers by using the same number of vehicles. Or we can 
serve the same number of customers with only 1 / n number of vehicles and 
drivers. In many cases there exist many possible routes to the destination 
and you can see that improvement can be amazingly large. 
2.2 Implication of Using Real-Time Traffic Information 
The most important of the result in this section is as follows. Even though 
some paths are inferior in terms of mean time required for arriving at the 
destination and thus are excluded by a driver, they can help reduce the time 
spent for arriving at the destination when the driver can get the real-time 
information on the traffic conditions of the roads. For example, suppose that 
there are two paths, paths 1 and 2, which are available to you. You usually 
take path 1 since it takes less time in the mean than path 2, that is E(X)<E 
(Y) where X and Y represent the random time required for traveling path 1 
and path 2 respectively. Sometimes traffic accidents or emergency road 
works occur on path 1. Without any information on the traffic conditions on 
paths 1 and 2, you will use path 1 and may spend lots of time caught in a 
traffic jam. If you have got the real-time information on the traffic conges- 
tion on path 1, you could choose path 2 and thus save a lot of opportunity 
cost even though it would take a little more time than it usually takes(since 
path 2 is like a detour). For the exponentially distributed travel time, the 
following example shows the point. 
Example 2: Let XI-Exp(A1) and X2--Exp(A2) and A1>A2. Then E(XI) 
=1/ A1<E(X2)=1 / A2, and thus path 1 is superior to path 2 in terms of 
mean value. But when we use the real-time information on the traffic states 
on paths 1 and 2, the time spent is min(X1, X2} and the mean time is 1 / (A 
14-22). It is clear that this value is smaller than both E(X1) and E(X2). Thus 
the inferior path in terms of mean(path 2, in this example) can sometimes 
be chosen for customer's benefit by using the real-time information. The 
benefit of using real-time information in this case is 
aE(Xl)+(l-a)E(X2) -E(min(Xl, X21) 
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When there are more than just two paths(in most cases it is true), the ben- 
efit of using real-time information on trafic states becomes larger. 
2.3 Social Benefit Improvement 
In this subsection we consider the social benefit improvement from using 
real time information on the traffic states. When a customer chooses the 
faster route using the real time information, he can not only save his own 
cost but also reduce the social cost as a whole. This reduction in social cost 
comes from the phenomenon that by not choosing the already congested 
road but taking the less congested path instead, a customer can avoid 
escalating the congestion cost in the society as a whole. Thus the real time 
information makes it possible for customers to choose a path for their own 
benefit. And this leads the society to use road capacity more effectively. 
Till now we only considered the time required for arriving at the desti- 
nation. We now extend the concept and introduce the cost function. We in- 
troduce the inconvenience or congestion cost functions V1 and V2. The con- 
gestion cost function Vi is a mapping from & to R+, where No={O, 1, 2, -.) 
and R+=[o, a). We assume that zV1<z) is convex in z, which is generally 
true for congestion cost functiondif Viz) is convex and increasing, then zVi 
(2) is clearly convex). For the case where we can approximate Vi such that 
the domain of Vi is also R+, we can derive more compact form of conditions 
correspending to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. These corresponding lemmas and 
various examples are in the appendix For example, Vlh) is the congestion cost 
felt by a customer who observes x cars in path 1 and decides to enter path 1. 
The pair of congestion cost functions(V1, V2) is called socially bemficial if 
the following conditions are satisfied: For any (x, y) such that Vl(x)>V2b), 
(~+1)v1(~+1)+yv2b)>b+1~v2GI+1~+xvl(x~ 
and for any (x, y) such that V1(x)<V2~), 
(X+~)V~(X+~)+YV~~)<~+I)V~(Y+~)+XV~(X) 
The conditions above say that by choosing less congested path we save the 
social cost as a whole. We now give the necessary and sufficient canditions 
for (V1, V2) to be socially beneficial congestion cost functions. For- the sim- 
plicity of our exposition, we assume that for any x, there exists y such that 
V,(x)=V2b). 
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lemma 2 Assume that zV,(x) is convex in z for i=l, 2. The necessary am? sqf- 
f icient conditions for (Vl, V2) to be socialZy beneficial are: for any h, y) such 
that V ~ ( X )  = Vlb), 
(x+l)V1(x+l)+yV2b) =xV1(x)+b+l)V2b+l). 
Proof: Define &(xi-1 )= (x+l )Vl(x+l) -xVl(x), &(y+l)= (y+l)V2(y+l) 
-yV2(y), and k(x, y)  = a l (x+l )  - ~ 2 ( y + l ) .  And let D' ={(x, y)  : V1(x)>V2 
0) and likewise for D'. Then the definition of social beneficiality is 
equivalent to 
For any (x, y) E D', k(x, y) > 0, 
For any (x, y) E D', k(x, y) > 0. 
Denoting E+ = {(x, y) : k(x, y)> OJ and E- = {(x, y) : k(x, y)< 01, two conditions 
above are D' c E' and D< c E-.  From the convexity of zV,iz), we know 
that k is increasing in x and decreasing in y. Using this property, we get the 
condition that the boundary of (D', D') and that of (E', E-) should be 
equal. And thus the conditions can be represented by for any (x, y )  such 
that Vl(x) =V2b), (x+l)Vl(x+l)+yV2b) =xVl(x)+b+l )V2b+l).0 
2.4 Socially Optimal Traffic Flow 
We have considered an individual customer as a decision maker for choos- 
ing a path. He chooses a path for his own benefit. For the congestion cost 
functions which are socially beneficial, his decision on the path for his own 
benefit is congruent with social benefit improvement. 
Now we consider a social agency which should minimize social cost due to 
congestion. The choices made by each individual customer may not necess- 
arily produce socially optimal solution. Suppose that there are m customers 
with real time information on traffic conditions and they choose one of paths 
1 and 2. The agency wants x* customers to choose path 1 and the other 
m-x* to choose path 2, where x* satisfies the following condition: 
x*= arg min {xVl(x) + (m - x)V2(m - x)). 
X 
Denoting the total congestion cost in the society as hh)  =xVl(x)+(m-x)V2 
(m -x) and ~ h ( x )  = h(x) - h(x- 1 ), we give the optimality conditions for the 
above cost minimization in the following lemma: 
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hmma 3 Assume that zV,(z) is convex in z f m  i = l ,  2. When there are m 
customers in the social system, and V1 and V2 are congestion cost functions f m  
paths 1 and 2 respectively, the condition for x* to be the unique socially qptimal 
flow amount for path 1 is as follows: 
~h(x*)<O and ~h(x*+l)>O. 
Proof: Since xVl(x) and yV26-d are assumed to be convex, h(x) is also convex. 
Therefore the first order necessary condition is also sufficient for the 
minimization. For x* to be the unique solution for minimizing h(x), the first 
order condition is ~h(x*)<O and nh(x*+l) >O. 
Suppose that there are sufficient number of customers with real time in- 
formation on traffic states. Here by sufficient, we mean that there are 
enough number of customers with real-time information trying to reduce 
their own costs and they can induce the equilibrium of balanced congestion 
costs along two paths. By trying to save their own cost, they will choose the 
less congested path. Thus if there are sufficient number of customers with 
real-time information, the traffic flow amount choosing each path will satisfy 
V1(2) =V&) at equilibrium, where 2 +y is the total number of customers 
using paths 1 and 2. That is, the congestion cost for each path should be the 
same at equilibrium. We now can ask a question whether the equilibrium of 
( 2 , y  ) is socially optimal. The choice for the path made by an individual for 
his own benefit does not necessarily give a socially optimal solution. The 
next theorem states that for a socially beneficial congestion cost function 
pair, the equilibrium induces the socially optimal solution as well. 
Propostion 1 Assume that zV,W is convex in z f m  i = l ,  2. When (V1, V2) is 
socially beneficial and there are szGffiaCZent number of customers with yea l time 
information who are going to use one of paths 1 and 2, the equilibrium state 
reached by each individual's choice is socially optimal. 
Proof: Since each individual would choose less congested path between the 
two, the amount of customers on each path, (2, F), should satisfy Vl(% )=V2 
6 ) and % +y = m (the total number of customers ). Since (V1, V 2 )  is assumed 
to be socially beneficial, we get by Lemma 2 
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It now suffices to show that 
XVi(%)+yIV2(VI)< (X-l)Vi(X -1)+@+1)V2G+1). 
XVl(%)+FV2@)< (%+l)Vl(X+l)+@ -1)V2(9-1). 
From (a), these two conditions are equivalent to 
ZVl(X)< (2 -1)V1(% -1)+(XC+l)V1(X+l), 
ZySV2G)< (yz -1)V2(VI -1)+@+1)V2(yz+I), 
and these are satisfied by the convexity of zVi(z). This means that (2 ,p)  is 
the socially optimal solution. 
The proposition above says that each individual's choice of path is 'com- 
patible' with social optimality for socially beneficial congestion cost 
functions. That is, using real-time information is beneficial to each individ- 
ual and to the society as a whole when (V1, V2) is socially beneficial. We now 
extend our definition for an individual's value of real-time information to 
the case of a society. As in Lemma 3, denote 9(m) as the optimal flow for 
path 1 given that the total number of cars trying to use either path 1 or 2 is 
m. In reality, m is not deterministic and thus let M be the random number 
of cars trying to use one of paths 1 and 2. Now define the value of real-time 
information for the society as follows: 
We can easily see that the value of information defined above is positive as 
follows: for socially beneficial(Vl, V2) and under the convexity of zV,(z), 
given m, real-time information induces socially optimal cost of x*(m)Vl(x*(m)) 
+ (m - x*(m)>V2(m - x*(m)) from individuals' path choice. We thus have 
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But we cannot expect each individual's choice for his own benefit to be 
compatible with the social optimality in general(especially for congestion 
cost functions which are not socially beneficial). In this case a government 
agency might intervene to induce the socially optimal solution. In the gen- 
eral case, we may levy 'tolls' for using a certain path and thus adjust the 
cost function perceived by an individual. With the adjusted cost function 
with the right amount of toll, each individual makes a choice on the path 
and constructs the socially optimal allocation of cars to each road. In reality, 
levying 'toll' can be effected as follows. One possibility is to manipulate 
traffic lights through the roads. By doing this we can change the time and 
the cost for using that particular road. Another possibility is to actually levy 
tolls for using tunnels or some segments of a road and induce the customer 
flow to the best of social utility. 
3. Case Where Departure 'Time Is a Decision Variable 
Now we deal with the case where we have a predetermined time at which 
we should deliver products to a customer. You can think of a parts delivery 
in JIT manufacturing system. In this setting we can choose our departure 
time for delivery and we have two kinds of cost: delay cost and early arrival 
cost. We suppose that cost of cd incurs per unit time of delayed arrival with 
respect to the schedule. And ce is the cost incurring for a unit time of earlier 
arrival than scheduled. When a truck company is required to deliver parts 
for JIT of a factory, not only cd but also c, plays a role in optimization. We 
define the critical fra~tile q = cd/(cd + ce). 
Suppose that we depart  decision variable) hours before scheduled time 
point t and let us denote 5 as a random variable representing the time spent 
to arrive at the destination. 
Then for a given w, the cost incurred is ce(w - <)++c& - w)+. We now are try- 
ing to choose UP which minimizes the expected cost of c~(w-<)++cA~-w)+. 
Let F ,  G, and H be distribution functions for X, Y, and Z=XAY respect- 
ively and these random numbers have the range of [0, TI. Then we can de- 
rive that H(z) = F(z)+G(z) - F(z)G(x). 
Denote the expected cost along path 1 when we depart w hours before 
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schedule as c ( w )  and 
This takes the similar cost function in newsvendor problem in inventory 
control. The optimal departure time for a company using path 1, W1, is from 
F(Wl)=q. When we use real-time information and choose a path accord- 
ingly, the time for arrival is 2. And let Wo denote the optimal departure 
time for a company using real-time information on trac conditions. Then 
as before, Wo satisfies H(Wo)=+ Since H(z)rF(z) for all z, we know that 
WlrWo. We now compare the optimal cost when we lack real-time infor- 
mation with that from using real-time information. 
Proposition 2 c ~ ( w ~ ) > c ~ ( w ~ )  holds if and only if 
K = J;F-'(U)~U - 'H - l(u)du = ~7 uf(u)du - J: uh(u)du. 
Proof: 
S o  
=~e(w-w)+(cd+ce)( =c&-c~c 
where T= (Wl - WO)~.  Note that (+K =p-pz. Thus the condition c'(wl)>C 
(Wo) is the same as c&> C ~ K  or equivalently q / (1 - q ) > K / 4. 
The condition (+t) is not satisfied in general. This result can be explained 
as follows. Even though we can shorten our delivery time using real-time in- 
formation on traffic conditions, the optimal cost by choosing optimal depar- 
ture time is not necessarily smaller than that of without the information 
case. Even without real-time information we can adjust our departure time 
and thus can possibly have less expected cost. But with real-time infor- 
mation, we have surplus time of Wl- Wo which can be used profitably. Thus 
when we incorporate the value of extra time(W1-WO) due to real-time infor- 
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mation, it is likely that we are better off with real-time information even 
when (-) is not satisfied. Both an example where (-) is satisfied and a case 
not satisfying (-) are given. 
Example 3: X--Exp(A) and Y--Exp(p). Then 2--Exp(l+p). In this case, de- 
noting ij=l-q, we get W1=-lnij/A and Wo=-lnij/ (A+p). And &=[p(V-ij 
lnij] / [A(A+p)] and K= [p(q+Vlnij)] / [A(A+p)]. The condition (**) now 
becomes 
This condition is satisfied since (cd+ce) ijlnij<O. 
Example 4: Let X--U[O, 11 and Y--U[O, 11. Then b= -1 / 2-t-q -$ / 2+2(1 -q 
"> / 3 and rc=2 / 3 - q+$ / 2 - 2( 1 - 1 / 3. The condition (w)  now becomes q(q 
-112 (% -8)<O. Therefore, for q E (8 / 9, I), the condition (-1 is not satisfied. 
4. Practical Implications 
Throughout this paper we studied the congestion cost functions from two 
perspectives: an individual and the society as a whole. For an individual's 
perspective, we were interested in the following: how much benefit will the 
driving customer get if he gets the real-time information on the traffic 
conditions on the roads which lead him to the destination? How much cost 
will a trucking company save by using the real-time information on the 
traffic conditions on the roads they are using? But the social perspective is 
not less important than the private perspective. This is especially true when 
the government considers the investment on the information system which 
will give consumers the real-time information on the traffc conditions. The 
reason is that the government should now consider the social welfare im- 
provement by introducing the information system, not just a person's cost 
reduction. In analyzing the investment on the information system, the 
government or other appropriate agency should consider the cost and the 
benefit it will induce when implemented. The result of Proposition 1 gives us 
the benefit from the information system for the society as a whole and thus 
helps the government set up an investment policy. As mentioned above we 
deal with the implications for both private and social sectors. 
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4.1 Private Sector 
By using the previous analysis, we can calculate the mean saving in cost 
which incurs from using the real-time information on the roads. If a system 
which will give us the real-time information requires less cost(inc1uding both 
the investment cost and usage cost) than the cost saved from the system, we 
had better go for the system. Thus our analysis will help us decide the price 
for those information systems using satellites giving the real-time infor- 
mation on the roads. GPS(Globa1 Positioning System) would be a good 
example for this application. 
And the author observed a private company which gives transportation 
service to the customers from / to airports using TRS(Trunked Radio Sys- 
tem). Drivers in each limo communicate interactively with the central office. 
By using the communication equipment, they give to the central office the 
real-time traffic condition on the road which they are currently using. This 
information on the roads is dispatched through the communication channel 
to those drivers who might use the roads and thus help them choose the less 
congested path to the destination. And the driver who gave the information 
on the traffic conditions also gets the real-time information on the next 
roads from the central office. And this information is received from the 
other driver who observed the situation previously. In this system, the cen- 
tral office works as a server which updates the information on the traffic 
conditions on roads and gives the appropriate information to the driver 
needing it. The cost saving and customer satisfaction increment from arriv- 
ing at the destination faster will be measured by the analysis studied in this 
paper. 
4.2 Public Sector 
To understand the social perspective, let us consider the following situ- 
ation. There are two paths(path 1 and path 2) for a customer between which 
he can choose for driving to the destination. By getting the real-time infor- 
mation on the traffic conditions on paths 1 and 2, he will choose the road 
which will lead him to the destination faster. This is the decision made by a 
person from his own perspective. He does not take into account whether his 
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decision will improve the social benefit as a whole. That is, his decision is 
based solely on his cost reduction, not on its impact on social cost due to 
traffic congestion. But his choosing the faster path may alleviate the social 
cost, This is because the cost in the traffic system as a whole might have be- 
come even larger if he had chosen the slower path due to lack of information 
and aggravated the already congested path. 
When a government agency considers an information center which gives 
real time information on traffic conditions, it should take into account the so- 
ciety's cost reduction which the information center will induce. Even though 
an individual decides a path for his own utility, the decision affects the 
traffic system as a whole and these impacts should be the criterion for the 
government agency. Though it is possible for private companies or 
individuals to invest on the information system and get the benefit of using 
real time information, there should be cases where it is better from 
cost / benefit perspective to invest the system for the society as a whole. 
The information systems, which are widely used for giving traffic infor- 
mation, are radio broadcasting channels focused on traffic information. They 
give information on tr-c and other accidents, and traffic conditions of sev- 
eral major roads in a city. By tuning on the traffic braodcasting channel, the 
drivers get the information on the roads and can respond by taking less con- 
gested routes to the destination. The major problem in this system is that 
the information flow is not based on individual demand and it is almost one 
way. A driver can not get the information when needed on the traffic con- 
dition of the road which he considers to enter. The order of the roads 
covered in the radio is set up and can not be changed for an individual's 
utility. 
Thus we have to consider the information systems which are somewhat 
interactive and selective in the sense that individuals can get the information 
on the roads in which they are interested in. This information is truly real 
time since the customers can get it when needed. We can think of an infor- 
mation center which updates the information on the traffic conditions of 
roads in a city by the real time feedback from member of drivers or closed 
circuit TVs. They set up codes for each segment of roads in the city and re- 
spond to the requests from the customers by giving the current information 
on the traffic condition of the road segment for their benefits by ARS 
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(Automated Response System ). 
By giving the information on the traffic conditions on the roads in the city, 
the information center can indirectly guide the individuals to less congested 
roads and thus improve their benefits. Also as studied previously, the infor- 
mation, in many cases, will give us resource pooling effect in the sense that 
all the roads are somewhat equally used and thus total social benefit 
increases. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we showed that there would be improvement in benefit by 
using real time information on traffic conditions. By using real time infor- 
mation on traffic conditions of each route, an individual could choose the 
less congested path and thus get to the destination faster than otherwise. 
With real time information, we could locate and choose less congested path 
to the destination, which does not necessarily incur less time in the mean. 
Real time information makes it possible to utilize the paths for a customer's 
benefit even though they are inferior in the mean time. This kind of benefit 
improvement was from individual point of view. Real time information could 
improve not only an individual's benefit but also the society's benefit as a 
whole. An individual's choosing less congested path due to real time infor- 
mation could alleviate the society's congestion cost since it prevents the 
already congested road from being exacerbated by incoming customers. 
Although we analyzed a traffic system which has multiple routes to the 
destination, the methodology can be applied to a general queueing system. 
Consider the queueing system where there are two servers in the system. 
Without any information on the queue state, we basically have two indepen- 
dent queues. If we have the real-time information on the queue states and 
can route arriving customers to less congested queue, we can utilize the ser- 
vice capacity more efficiently and thus can save the mean throughput time 
substantially(Nam[1993] ). Thus our method can be corresponded to the dy - 
narnic scheduling(r0uting) problem in queueing system with multiple queues 
and servers. 
A real traffic system can be represented by a network, which is a more 
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general form than that covered in this paper. A general queueing newtork is 
well-known for its analytical complexity (Harrison[1988] ). As asserted pre - 
viously, one of our focuses is on an individual(clear1y having one departure 
node and one destination node) whose time is saved through real-time infor- 
mation. This means that an individual can choose for its benefit one of the 
multiple paths from a departure node to the destination by using real-time 
information. Our model can also be generalized to the case where an individ- 
ual has the option of not entering the traffic system as well. 
Throughout this paper, we implicitly assumed that once we knew the 
traffic conditions in each route these wouldn't change until an individual is 
served(i.e. arrive at the destination). In the future research, we should try 
to generalize this assumption. And we should also incorporate adequate cost 
function for introducing real time information system as well. In the future, 
we should empirically study the waiting cost function of each individual and 
derive the value of real -time information. 
Appendix 
A. 1 Socially beneficial Congestion Costs -Continuous Case 
We give corresponding lemmas for Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 in the case of 
v~:R+ +R'. We assume that zVik) is convex as before and Vi are twice con- 
tinuously differentible for i=l, 2. 
h m a  4 The necessary and sufficient conditions for (Vl, V2) to be socially ben- 
eficial are: fm any (x, y) such that Vl(x) =V2b), we have 
d For this lemma, define K(x, y) = xVl(x) -yVzb) and use kk,  Y) = -$xVl(x)) 
d --bV2b)), which is the directional derivative of K along [I, 11 ' . 
dy 
kmma 5 When there are m customevs in the society, the condition for x* to be a 
socially optimal flow amount for path 1 is: 
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A 2  Examples of Socially Beneficial Congestion Costs 
We now give five examples of socially beneficial congestion cost functions. 
The last example is the case of non-socially beneficial cost functions. 
Example 1 : V1(x) =axk and V2(y) =byk where a, b > 1. 
Example 2 : Vl(x) = cx and V2b) =dY where c, d > 0. 
Example 3 : Any symmetric congestion cost functions, that is, Vl(x) =V2(x) 
for all x. 
Example 4 : VI(x) = Z& and V2(y) = 6. In this example, the reader should 
note that Vi are not convex functions but they are socially beneficial. 
Example 5(Queueing) : We take mean waiting time for a queueing system 
as a congestion cost function. That is, 
for i=l, 2. 
Example 6 :  Let Vl(x)=x and V 2 ( y ) = ~ .  At (10, 3), we have Vl(10)>V2(3). 
But (11 )V1(11)+37/2(3)=148< lOV1(10)+4V2(4)=164. 
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